This paper employs an endogenous merger formation approach in a two-country oligopoly model of trade to examine the international linkages between the nature of mergers and tariff levels. Firms sell differentiated products and compete in a Bertrand fashion in product markets. Two effects play key roles in determining equilibrium market structure: the tariff saving effect and the protection gain effect. The balance between these two effects implies that, when foreign country practices free trade, low home tariffs yield international mergers irrespective of the substitutability levels. By contrast, when foreign tariffs are sufficiently high and products are close substitutes, national mergers obtain in the equilibrium. Unlike this asymmetric result of unilateral trade liberalization, we find that when bilateral tariffs are sufficiently low, international mergers arise. These results fit well with the fact that global trade liberalization has been accompanied by an increase in international merger activities. From a welfare perspective, we show that international mergers are preferable to national mergers and thus social and private merger incentives become aligned together as trade gets bilaterally liberalized. Finally, if countries can commit to a trade policy, they would optimally commit to a low tariff to induce international mergers when products are close substitutes while any tariff commitment is optimal when products are sufficiently differentiated.
Introduction
Over the last three decades, along with international trade liberalization, the world economy has witnessed the largest ever merger movement, with a particularly high incidence of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). 1 New patterns of globalization have accelerated the internationalization of industries and reshaped the global industrial structure. According to the World Investment Report (WIR) 2007, international mergers and corporate take-overs have been the key driver of global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows since the late 1980s. Cross-border M&As have grown by 23% to $880 billion in 2006, and the number of transactions has increased by 14% to 6,974 reflecting a strong global M&A activity in general. An interesting feature of the current wave of cross-border M&As is that it is truly international, as opposed to the previous merger waves which involved primarily U.S. firms. It no longer makes sense to see takeover booms and busts as national phenomena. While most of the mega deals with transaction values of more than $1 billion were carried out in developed countries, 17% of the cross-border M&As were realized in developing countries and transition economies; China is the leading host country among developing countries by far. 2 Most cross-border M&As have been horizontal in nature, aiming at free access to the export market via savings on tariffs and trade costs, increasing market power, economies of scale, technological synergies, eliminating excess capacity, or consolidating and streamlining innovation strategies and R&D budgets. 3 This paper attempts to provide an explanation for the high incidence of cross-border mergers by focusing on the first two of the above incentives. Specifically, we examine the implications of the fall in tariffs and trade costs on the nature of mergers.
The traditional literature on FDI has analyzed the determinants of FDI without distinguishing between FDI and cross-border M&As. Motivated by the 'tariffjumping' argument, the focus has been the international location decisions of firms, and it is argued that as trade costs rise and exporting becomes a more costly option, firms are more likely to choose greenfield investment abroad. Markusen (1995) surveyed the theoretical literature on FDI and multinational enterprises (MNE). 1 Over this period, countries have pursued trade liberalization along several front: unilaterally, preferentially with a few partners, and multilaterally within the world trade organization (WTO). As a result, average tariff levels have fallen dramatically, especially in manufacturing industries. 2 For example, while the volume of cross-border M&A was less than a billion dollars in Turkey, it reached an unprecedented level of $50 billion for the period [2005] [2006] [2007] . 3 The leading industries in the manufacturing sector in terms of worldwide cross-border M&A activities have been automobiles, pharmaceuticals and chemicals, and food, beverages and tobacco. The immediate examples in the auto industry include the ones between Daimler-Chrysler, Renault and Nissan and GM and Saab. Markusen (2002) formalized these ideas theoretically while Brainard (1997) , Carr et al. (2001) and Bloningen et al. (2003) provide empirical evidence on this issue.
Recently, researchers have investigated the determinants of cross-border M&As from a more industrial organization oriented background leading to a completely different view regarding the importance of trade costs and tariffs. Horn and Persson (2001b) , Bjorvatn (2003) , Persson (2004, 2005) , Benchekroun and Chaudhuri (2006) , Qiu and Zhou (2006) and Hijzen et al. (2007) provide theoretical models which study cross border mergers as an alternative mode of entry and endogenize the merger formation process. Unlike the 'tariff-jumping' argument in the traditional literature on FDI, this strand of literature argues that high trade costs do not necessarily induce cross-border M&As. The focus and the modeling framework of the present paper falls within this literature and focuses on the impact of unilateral and bilateral trade liberalization on the nature of mergers. Another line of research explores regulation issues and the interaction between merger policies and trade liberalization. 4 We also focus on this issue by isolating the role of the nature of mergers: domestic versus international.
What are the effects of unilateral and bilateral tariff reduction on the nature of mergers (national or international) that emerges at the equilibrium? Which type of mergers (national or international) is preferred from a welfare point of view? What if tariff determination and merger formation are both endogenous? To address these questions, the present paper uses the cooperative approach of endogenous merger formation developed by Persson (2001a, 2001b) in determining equilibrium market structure for different degrees of product differentiation and tariff levels.
The model considers an oligopolistic industry in which firms sell differentiated goods and compete in prices. The interaction between firms takes place in two stages. In the first stage, we determine the industry structure: firms decide whether to merge domestically, internationally or stay as competing units. In the second stage, firms compete over prices in the product markets (Bertrand fashion). Unlike much of the literature on mergers and competition policy, we follow Deneckere and Davidson's (1985) approach and utilize price competition in the product market. Since Salant et al. (1985) , it is well known that under quantity competition, merging firms can actually lose from a merger, since the merged unit concedes market share to outside firms. As a result, it is important to examine merger and trade policies in an environment where firms actually gain from mergers. In other words, it seems unsatisfactory to examine a government's optimal degree of market concen-tration without ensuring that firms actually desire that level of concentration. Like much of the literature on trade policy under imperfect competition, we assume that markets are segmented -i.e., there is no arbitrage across international markets and firms make independent decisions regarding what price to charge in each market.
It is important to note that the origins of merging firms are important due to the existence of trade policy in the model. If asset owners from the same country merge, the resulting firm is a national firm that faces a tariff disadvantage in the export market while enjoying protection in the domestic market. On the other hand, if asset owners from different countries merge, the resulting firm is international in nature and has the advantage of avoiding tariffs and trade costs in both markets.
In exploring the nature of merger incentives, two effects play crucial roles: protection gain and tariff jumping. 5 The first of these represents the anticompetitive impact of trade policy and arises when firms are national units while the tariffjumping effect simply captures the incentive to avoid tariffs and trade costs by merging with a firm in the export market. The balance between these two counteracting effects determine the bargaining structure among firms in the merger formation process. Within our model, the tariff levels and the degree of product differentiation together create a trade-off between the relative attractiveness of national and international mergers. When tariff levels and the degree of product market competition among firms (i.e., products are sufficiently close substitutes) are both sufficiently high, the former effect dominates the latter generating a tendency for national mergers. On the other hand, when tariffs are sufficiently low (close to free trade), the tariff-jumping effect dominates the protection gain. The higher the degree of product differentiation the more likely this result obtains.
The implications of unilateral home trade liberalization are examined at two extreme foreign trade policy regimes. When a foreign country practices free trade, lowering home tariffs induces firms to form international mergers irrespective of the degree of product differentiation. However, when foreign tariffs are sufficiently high (at a prohibitive level), the impact of unilateral home trade liberalization depends upon the degree of product differentiation: the international mergers arise at the equilibrium when products are sufficiently differentiated whereas equilibrium mergers are national in nature when products are close substitutes.
We examine the effects of bilateral trade liberalization on the nature of mergers by assuming a common exogenous tariff level in both markets and then lowering it. In contrast to unilateral trade liberalization, the tariff reduction is realized in both markets so that both the tariff-jumping effect and the protection gain from the use of tariffs decline. The main result here is that, as trade gets sufficiently 5 The tariff-jumping effect was referred to as tariff saving in the initial versions of the paper. liberalized (i.e., tariffs are sufficiently low), the resulting equilibrium market structure is the one with international mergers. This result is consistent with the fact that global trade liberalization has been accompanied by an increase in cross-border merger activities.
Turning to welfare, three effects play crucial roles in determining preferred market structures from a welfare point of view: (i) the standard trade-off between the effects of market concentration on producer surplus and consumer welfare, (ii) the standard anticompetitive effects of tariffs, and (iii) the free-rider effect that can be measured as the amount by which the profits of a non-merging firm increase when a merger happens arising under asymmetric market structures. Among equilibrium market structures, we find that the tariff saving feature tips the balance in favor of international mergers, and thus we find that social and private merger incentives become aligned together as trade gets liberalized. This result provides support for the idea that there is scope for welfare-enhancing merger policies under a more liberal trade environment.
Furthermore, we examine the scenario where countries can commit to bilateral tariffs before firms decide whether to merge domestically, internationally or stay as competing units. We find that when products are sufficiently differentiated, any tariff commitment is optimal, since welfare-preferred international mergers arise regardless of the tariff levels. However, we find that the level of tariff commitment is critical when products are close substitutes: countries would optimally commit to a tariff that is below a certain threshold to induce international mergers.
Then, we allow that trade policy in each country may respond to changes in market structure and examine the equilibrium market structures under optimum tariffs. Our first finding is that the relationship between protection incentives and market concentration depends on the nature of the concentration: while optimum tariffs rise as the market gets more concentrated nationally, the opposite arises when higher concentration occurs due to international mergers. When firms merge internationally, the benefit from protection is shared with a foreign partner. There are a number of empirical studies that explore the interaction between the industry concentration and the level of protection and the results are inconclusive. Whereas Trefler (1993) , and Bandyopadhyay and Gawande (2000) found significant positive relationships between industry concentration and the level of protection, Baldwin (1985) , and Anderson and Baldwin (1987) report a negative relationship. The present paper provides one explanation for this ambiguity in the sense that the nature of the concentration (national or international) is important in determining optimal trade policy. Then, we find under endogenous trade policy that international mergers arise when products are sufficiently differentiated, while national mergers arise in the equilibrium when products are close substitutes. This finding implies that when the products are sufficiently differentiated, private and social incentives tend to move together under endogenous trade policy.
Finally, we extend our analysis to include an asymmetric duopoly where there is an international merger of three firms and a competing national firm. We find that, since merging firms under an asymmetric duopoly benefit from their deeper concentration without giving up the tariff protection in the domestic market, the duopoly with two national mergers no longer arises in the equilibrium if an asymmetric duopoly is allowed to be formed. Moreover, unless products are sufficiently differentiated, an asymmetric duopoly arises as the unique equilibrium market structure.
The present paper is closely related to Horn and Persson (2001b) that employs a similar model to show that the international pattern of ownerships depends on trade and production costs. Unlike the homogeneous-good Cournot model in Horn and Persson (2001b) , the present paper uses price competition with product differentiation. By interpreting trade cost as tariff levels, we complement Horn and Persson (2001b) and examine the implications of unilateral and bilateral trade liberalization on the equilibrium mergers. If trade costs are interpreted as tariff levels, the equilibrium characterization in Horn and Persson (2001b) implies that an empty set of market structures (i.e., there is no equilibrium) arises for low tariff levels in their trade cost saving model. The present paper shows that the choice of price as a basic strategic variable instead of quantity overcomes this problem. This improvement stems from the fact that under price competition, every single merger is profitable and there is no trivial elimination of concentrated market structures (see Lemma 1) . Finally, unlike Horn and Persson (2001b) , the present paper also examines equilibrium market structure under trade policy commitment and endogenous trade policy.
Basic Model
The model is a two country partial equilibrium set-up in which countries are denoted by z = H (home country), F (foreign country). In each country, there is a single industry consisting of two firms that produce symmetrically differentiated products. 6 We denote the home firms by i = h, h and foreign firms by i = f , f . 6 Like the most of the existing literature, we assume a minimal symmetric model of oligopolistic industry, which sells its outputs in segmented markets (see Faria Firms' assets are located in their own domestic country. We assume that entry to the industry is restricted. 7 Firms own the exclusive technology for their particular brand (e.g., through patents) and each firm is described by its brand demand function. The marginal cost of production for all firms is assumed to be constant (c ≥ 0) and identical.
Following Shubik (1980) , let the utility function be defined as:
where q z is a vector of quantities: q z = (q hz , q h z , q f z , q f z ), q iz denotes firm i's sales in country z and γε[0, ∞) is a measure of substitutability between products. Then, we obtain the following symmetric demand system:
where p z is a vector of prices and p iz denotes the price charged by firm i in country z. It is important to note that the degree of product differentiation between any two goods is the same, and when γ approaches zero, products become unrelated (extreme heterogeneity) while they become perfect substitutes when γ goes to infinity. From hereon, without loss of generality, we assume that c = 0. The game proceeds as follows. In the first stage, industry structure is determined through bargaining between the firm owners: they decide whether to merge domestically, internationally or stay as competing units. In the second stage, firms compete in the product markets in a Bertrand fashion. Constant marginal costs and price competition together indicate that markets are strategically separated from each other. Thus, we assume that markets are segmented.
In determining equilibrium market structure, we utilize a cooperative approach of endogenous merger formation developed by Horn and Persson (2001a) . Unlike Horn and Persson (2001b), we utilize price competition as in Deneckere and Davidson (1985) where a merger of two firms is equivalent to perfect collusion between them. 8 In other words, merging firms are allowed to shut down the operation formation model that involves discrete comparisons of market structures, as the number of firms increases, the possible market structures explode. However, note that as long as we compare the incentives to form national and international mergers of the same size, most of the analysis in the present paper extends into an n-firm framework. 7 It may be due to some firm-specific ownership advantages of the incumbent firms. 8 Under mergers, when we refer to product differentiation, it means a firm differentiation, since the model implies full within-firm cannibalization of all brands that are owned. of some of their plants but may not alter the characteristics of their products. 9 It is well known under price competition that, if allowed by the competition authority, firms have incentives to merge all the way to monopoly because the combined profits of all firms in other market structures are smaller than monopoly profits. Since the focus is on the distinction between the incentives to form national and international mergers, we initially focus on the mergers of the same size. Thus, only twofirm mergers are allowed and highly concentrated market structures (monopoly and an asymmetric duopoly with international merger of three firms) are excluded. 10 The symmetry of the model indicates that there are 10 possible ownership structures that can be represented by 5 different market structures: 11
Triopoly with one national merger:
Triopoly with one international merger:
Duopoly with two national mergers: NN = {hh , f f }
Duopoly with two international mergers
The impact of trade liberalization on the equilibrium market structure (EMS) is examined by assuming exogenous tariff levels faced by exporting firms and then lowering those tariffs. The existence of tariff protection implies that the origin of merging firms matters. National firms (either nonmerged units or domestic mergers involving firms from the same country) have trade protection in their own country but face a tariff disadvantage while serving in the export market. By contrast, an international firm (involving one firm from each country) is assumed to be able to produce each of its varieties in each of the two countries' markets, thereby avoiding tariffs in both markets.
In order to obtain a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we solve the game using backward induction. Thus, we first take the market structure and exogenous 9 We assume that there exists no rationalization of production to save on fixed or variable costs in order to isolate the role of tariffs and trade costs for merger incentives. The downside of this assumption is that the role tariffs play may be exaggerated. 10 We simply assume that the competition authorities rule out these highly concentrated market structures. For completeness, we include an asymmetric duopoly with international merger of three firms in section 6. 11 Hereafter, in order to simplify notation, each market structure will be referred to its first ownership structure and denoted by the corresponding notation.
tariffs as given and analyze the product market equilibrium. We denote the tariffs per unit of output in the home and foreign country by t H and t F respectively.
No Mergers Φ
The profit maximization problem of firm i in the export market of country z under Φ is given by: 12
where
, and P z denotes the average price realized in country z's market:
where j = h, h , f , f . The first order condition for the above problem yields firm i's reaction function under {Φ} :
where P −iz denotes the sum of prices of firm i's competitors: P −iz = ∑ j =i p jz . As expected, since prices are strategic complements, we obtain positively sloped reaction functions. The equilibrium price charged by firm i under Φ is found by solving the first order conditions of all firms simultaneously. We denote the equilibrium price of firm i in country z under market structure S by p S iz . Due to symmetry and market segmentation, we focus on the home country only: 13
It is immediately clear from the above price levels that a country's tariff raises the price charged by the exporting firms more than the one of its own firms:
In order to ensure the market access of exporting firms under Φ , 12 While serving in the domestic market, tariffs drop out. 13 The explicit formulae of the equilibrium profits under each market structure are reported in the appendix.
we exclude prohibitive tariff level (denoted by t z
One National Merger
Now, consider the market structure N under which home firms merge while foreign firms stay as competing units. 15 While the profit maximization problem of foreign firms stay the same as under Φ , home merger solves the following problem in the export market:
Then, the following equilibrium prices obtain in home and foreign markets under N :
In the pre-merger situation under Φ , when a firm contemplated raising prices, it did not care about the positive externality it would confer upon the other firms. However, by internalizing this positive externality, home merging firms set a higher price under N relative to Φ : p N hH > p Φ hH and the increase in price due to a merger gets larger (smaller) as own (foreign) tariffs rise:
More importantly, since the reaction function of foreign firms has a slope uniformly less than one, nonmerged foreign firms free ride by raising their prices less than the home merger and thus enjoying price increase and market share gain together. 16 Since home firms raise the price after merger, it is immediate that the condition t H ≤ t H Φ still guarantees the market access of foreign firms in home market under N : 17
One International Merger
In our model, tariffs can be avoided by merging with local producers in the export market. Consider the market structure I under which firms h and f merge while other firms (h and f ) stay as competing units. While the profit maximization problem of nonmerged firms stays the same as under Φ , international merger solves the following problem in each market:
The simultaneous solution of the first order conditions leads to the following equilibrium prices under I : 18
and
Note that internationally-merged firms h and f have free access in both markets under I while firm h faces t F and firm f faces t H in the export markets. Thus, 16 Under free trade, the free-rider effect can be strong enough that the profits of non-merging firms exceed those of the merged unit. 17 the export market access of firms h and f is more limited relative to other market structures, and this leads to a lower prohibitive tariff level under I :
As a result, in order to ensure market access under all possible market structures, we assume that t z < t I holds from hereon out.
Two National Mergers
When there exist two national mergers, merged home and foreign firms solve the same problem in the export markets as in (6) and the following prices obtain: 19
As might be expected, among all possible market structures, the highest equilibrium price levels obtain under NN , due to the existence of both tariff and merger effects.
Two International Mergers
When all firms merge internationally, they save on tariffs and free trade emerges. Internationally-merged firms solve the same problem as in (9) and the following prices obtain:
Next, we sort out the equilibrium market structures using an endogenous merger formation approach.
Endogenous Merger Formation
The solution procedure in the present paper is based on the endogenous merger formation model developed by Horn and Persson (2001a) . 20 Based upon the earlier literature on mergers, and on actual observations of firms' behavior, they take the view that merger formation can be treated as a cooperative game, since parties involved in the formation process are free to communicate and sign binding contracts. This approach is a generalization of traditional merger analysis, since comparisons are made between all feasible market structures rather than two exogenously given market structures one of which is a strict concentration of the other. In this model, there are three basic components: 21 Two assumptions are made in the merger formation process. First, no payment between coalitions is allowed. Second, when forming a merger, participating firms can choose any payoff distribution among themselves subject to the constraint that the total payoff distributed be exactly equal to the merged unit's total profit in the second stage of the game.
In order to illustrate the main ideas behind these components, consider the comparison between N = {hh , f , f } and I = {h f , h , f } under both of which firm f stays as a competing unit. Since payments between coalitions are not allowed, firm f is not able to influence the ranking of these market structures so that it is not a decisive firm. Now turn to other firms. If the market structure N is formed, firm f does not participate in any merger. In order to prevent this, if firm f 's profit is higher under I , it may offer to firm h a larger share of payoff of the merger under the market structure I . On the other hand, firm h may make a counter-offer to induce a merger with firm h if it's profit is higher under N . This bargaining process implies that firms h, h , and f have the ability to affect the ranking of market structures N and I so that these firms are defined to be decisive firms denoted by D N&I = {h, h , f }. 22 Note that there may be more than one group of decisive firms. As another example, consider now the ranking of the following two market structures: Φ = other firm and announces an asking price for her own simultaneously. Equilibrium market structure is determined following a general allocation scheme once all bids and asking prices are known. This approach applies to situations where there are many firms and owners. Chatterjee et al. (1993) and Ray and Vohra (1998) portray the merger formation as a non-cooperative extensive form bargaining game. 21 See Horn and Persson (2001a) for formal definitions of decisive firms and dominance relation. 22 It is important to note that the dominance relation is not transitive if (a) decisive group(s) of firms is (are) not the same. Furthermore, it is clear that two market structures can not dominate each other simultaneously.
{h, h , f , f }, and II = {h f , h f }. All four firms are decisive with respect to these two market structures. However, merger formation processes are not linked so that there are two distinct groups decisive firms:
If there are two groups of decisive firms, it is required that domination holds for each of the groups.
Finally, the solution concept is the core: equilibrium market structures are the ones that are undominated.
Trade Liberalization and Equilibrium Market Structure
Before proceeding, let π s i denote the total profit (sum of domestic and export profit) firm i earns under market structure s: 
π I i . Note that the above lemma provides support to the traditional merger literature under price competition, since nonmerged units always have incentives to merge. Using the above lemma and the definition of decisive firms, we argue that the market structures Φ , N , and I are dominated and thus they fail to arise in the equilibrium, and NN and II remain the only candidates that can arise at the core. Thus, in determining the set of equilibrium market structures, the comparison between the market structures NN and II is taken as a base scenario in order to highlight the decisive forces in the merger formation process. Since there is only one decisive group comprising all four firms with respect to NN and II , aggregate industry profits are compared. Let R s i denote the total revenue of firm i under market structure s. Then we can define the relative attractiveness of national mergers denoted by g II&NN (t H ,t F ) as follows: 23
Using the differentiation technique, the function in (14) evaluated at ( t H , t F ) 23 Naturally, g II&NN (t H = 0,t F = 0) = 0.
can be be rewritten as follows:
The sign of g II&NN (t H ,t F ) hinges on two distinct effects: the protection-gain effect and the tariff-jumping effect. The former effect represents the anticompetitive impact of the trade policy that arises when firms are national units and is captured by the first two terms in (15) . They simply measure the change in the national merger's aggregate profits net of tariff payment relative to a scenario where both countries practice free trade. Since trade policy reduces the degree of competition in the domestic market, it tends to make the industry profits under NN higher. On the other hand, the tariff-jumping effect is captured by the last two terms in (15) . They create incentives for firms to merge internationally in order to avoid tariffs in the export markets. The balance between these two effects helps determine which of these market structures ( NN or II ) would arise in the equilibrium. Here, it is important to emphasize the fact that the degree of product differentiation γ acts as an important determinant of the relative strengths of these two counteracting effects, since it measures the intensity of competition in the product markets. Next, we examine the implication of unilateral trade liberalization on the set of equilibrium market structures.
Unilateral trade liberalization
To examine the impact of unilateral home trade liberalization on the nature of mergers, we assume exogenous tariff levels (t H and t F ), and then we lower home tariffs keeping foreign tariffs unchanged. To this end, we isolate two distinct trade policy regimes in the foreign country. First, consider a scenario where the foreign country practices free trade.
Free Trade Abroad
When there is free trade in the foreign country, the type of mergers arising in the core is only governed by the difference in aggregate profits in the home market and thus we focus on the first term and the third term in (15).
Figures 1a, 1b and 1c represent the behavior of g II&NN (t H ,t F = 0) for three different degrees of product differentiation. When products are sufficiently differentiated (γ = γ l ), g II&NN (t H ,t F = 0) < 0 for all admissible t h implying that the tariff jumping effect dominates the protection gain and thus leading to international mergers. The intuition can be explained as follows. When products are highly differentiated, firms already have high market power and the marginal benefit of tariff protection is small relative to tariff saving incentives. On the other hand, when γ is in the intermediate range (γ = γ m ), g II&NN (t H ,t F = 0) takes a U-shape and is positive only when home tariffs are sufficiently high. Therefore, the tariff jumping effect dominates the protection-gain effect unless home tariffs are very high: international mergers arise in the EMS when t H < t H holds, while national mergers obtain when t H > t H holds. 24 Finally, when products are close substitutes (γ = γ h ), product market competition is severe and firms are close to the Bertrand paradox. Under such a situation, tariff protection provides room for national firms to enjoy profits in a highly competitive trade environment so that the protection gain dominates the tariff-jumping effect for a larger range of tariff levels (t H declines). 
These observations about the behavior of g II&NN (t H ,t F = 0) provide the basis for figure 2 that plots the critical tariff level t II&NN H (γ) at which aggregate profits under NN and II are the same:
24 Persson (2004, 2005) show that the similar U-shape relationship obtains for bilateral trade liberalization under Cournot competition with a strictly concave demand. Note that under price competition, U-shape obtains only when γ takes intermediate values (otherwise, monotonicity obtains). 
The following proposition is immediate:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the foreign country practices free trade. There exists a critical degree of product differentiation γ min such that (i) when products are sufficiently differentiated (γ < γ min ), the duopoly with two international mergers II is the equilibrium market structure for all t H , and (ii) when products are close substitutes (γ ≥ γ min ), II is the equilibrium market structure if t H is sufficiently low while national mergers NN arise if t H is high.
First, it is important to note from figure 2 and proposition 1 that the set of equilibrium market structures is non-empty for all non-prohibitive tariff levels irrespective of the degree of product differentiation. In that sense, the model is well-behaved. Second, as expected from the analysis above, t II&NN H (γ) is downward sloping in γ, and there exists a lower limit γ min below which international mergers arise for all t H levels. More importantly, the above result provides support for the idea that when a foreign country practices free trade, unilateral home trade liberalization increases the incentives of firms to form international mergers irrespective of the substitutability levels. What if a foreign country practices very restrictive trade policy? Next, we examine this question.
Restrictive Trade Policy Abroad
Now suppose that a foreign country imposes the highest possible non-prohibitive tariff level t F = t I . Under such a scenario, the function g II&NN (t H ,t F = t I ) can be rewritten as follows:
(19) Note that since t F is sufficiently high, the product market in the foreign country approaches being a foreign-firm monopoly under NN . As discussed above, when products are sufficiently differentiated, firms' benefits from tariff protection is limited. On the other hand, relative to the case of free trade in foreign country, the tariff-jumping effect gets more pronounced when t F = t I and thus
obtains (see figures 3a). As a result, II
arises in the equilibrium for all t H when products are sufficiently differentiated.
When γ gets higher, the degree of product market competition and the existence of high tariffs in foreign country tip the balance more in favor of the protection gain. As a result, g II&NN (t H ,t F = 0) shifts upward, making national mergers more likely to arise as the equilibrium market structure. More specifically, when γ = γ m , g II&NN (γ), the protectionist trade environment leads to national mergers, due to the merged firms' monopoly power in their own markets.
Finally, product markets are highly competitive when products are close substitutes (γ = γ h ), and thus regardless of home tariff levels, it is impossible to attract foreign firms in forming an international merger: g II&NN (t H ,t F = t I ) ≥ 0 for all t H (see figure 3c) . The following proposition summarizes the above discussion and illustrated in figure 4 : Figure 4 : Equilibrium market structure (
Combining proposition 1 and proposition 2 we argue that when products are highly differentiated, international mergers emerge in the set of EMS irrespective of trade policy regimes abroad. By contrast, when products are close substitutes and home tariff falls below a certain threshold, reversal of trade policy abroad from free trade to a protectionist regime shifts the nature of equilibrium mergers from an international one to a national one.
Given the discussion above, it is natural to ask: what are the implications of bilateral trade liberalization on the nature of mergers? We examine this question next.
Bilateral Trade Liberalization
The effects of bilateral trade liberalization on the set of equilibrium market structures is examined by assuming a common exogenous tariff level (t H = t F = t) in both countries and lowering it. The relative gain from national mergers is found as follows:
It follows from (16) and (20) that g II&NN (t) = 2g II&NN (t H = t,t F = 0). Consequently, g II&NN (t) behaves the same way as g II&NN (t H ,t F = 0), illustrated in figures 1a, 1b and 1c . To save space, we show the equilibrium market structures for different t and γ levels in figure 5 . Note from figure 5 that there exists no equilibrium market structure when only γ is at the intermediate range and t is very high. The intransitivity of the dominance relation leads to this non-existence problem. It is shown in the appendix that over the given region, NN dominates all other market structures except for I which, in turn, is dominated by II for all t and γ levels (see Lemma 1) .
More importantly, we confirm the above two propositions, since the total industry profits under NN and II yields the following: II dominates NN for all t when γ < γ min ; (ii) II dominates NN when γ > γ min and t < t II&NN (γ) hold and (iii) NN dominates II when γ > γ min and t > t II&NN (γ) hold where 
Thus, the following proposition is immediate: Proposition 3 Suppose that tariffs are symmetric in both countries (t H = t F = t). Then, there exists a critical degree of product differentiation γ min such that (i) when products are sufficiently differentiated (γ < γ min ), the duopoly with two international mergers II is the equilibrium market structure for all t, and (ii) when products are close substitutes (γ ≥ γ min ), II is the equilibrium market structure if t is sufficiently low while national mergers NN arise if t is sufficiently high.
The above result complements and improves the main findings by Horn and Persson (2001b) in an important way. To see this, note that the set of EMS is empty under their benchmark trade cost saving model when t < 1 15 holds and this can be interpreted as follows: when bilateral tariffs fall below a certain threshold, Horn and Persson (2001b) has no ability to conjecture an equilibrium market structure. On the contrary, we find that international mergers obtain over the same range of tariffs. The choice of price as a basic strategic variable instead of quantity overcomes this problem, since every concentrative merger is profitable under price competition and there is no trivial elimination of concentrated market structures.
It is also important to note that the above proposition fits well with the fact that global trade liberalization has been accompanied by an increase in cross border merger activities. One point deserves attention: when products are close substitutes, we obtain national mergers in the equilibrium for sufficiently high tariffs. This result seems to provide an opposite intuition to the tariff-jumping argument in the existing FDI literature. However note that the tariff-jumping argument is made for a single firm by focusing on only two alternative modes of entry: export versus FDI. Unlike the present paper, these two alternatives are compared in the export market when the degree of market concentration remains the same. Moreover, FDI occurs via an international merger in our model and all decisive firms involved in the merger-formation process benefit from tariff saving and lose from tariff protection in their domestic markets. By contrast, under a greenfield entry, firms investing in the foreign country directly enjoy tariff saving without losing their gains from protection in the domestic market.
Even though no specific payoff division in any merger is assumed, from a welfare point of view, it is reasonable to assume that profits are evenly divided between the merging firms, since the feasible market structures are completely symmetric when t H = t F = t. We identify three main forces in determining the welfare ranking of different market structures. First, as in the closed economy, there is a standard trade-off between the effects of market concentration on consumer and producer welfare. In the open economy, part of the cost of domestic concentration is transmitted to foreign consumers. Second, domestic tariffs protect national firms in the domestic country whereas foreign tariffs punish them in the export market and consumer welfare decreases in tariffs. Note that this second source of tension vanishes completely under a duopoly with two international mergers and partially under a triopoly with one international merger. Finally, under asymmetric market structures ( N and N ) , a merger confers a large positive externality (free-rider effect) on competing firms. The degree of the free-rider effect can be measured as the amount by which the profits of a non-merging firm increase when a merger happens. As in Davidson and Deneckere (1985) , the free-rider effect of a merger is so strong that the profits of nonmerging firms exceed those of the merged unit:
Based on this discussion, figure 6 illustrates the pattern of the most preferred market structures for different tariff and substitutability levels.
First, we consider a scenario where the tariff levels are relatively low. Under such an environment, the anticompetitive effect of trade policy on consumer and producer welfare does not play a major role from a welfare point of view. Moreover, when products are sufficiently differentiated, the free-rider effect under asymmetric market structures is not very strong too. Then, the most important concern is the anticompetitive effect of market concentration on consumer and producer welfare. Therefore, as might be expected, the least concentrated market structure Φ is the most preferred market structure when products are highly differentiated. However, when products are close substitutes, there is a severe competition among firms, so that the free-rider effect of a foreign merger to home competing firms tips the balance in favor of N . 
Now consider a relatively more protectionist regime where the tariff saving feature of international mergers gets more pronounced as do the anticompetitive effects of the trade policy on consumer welfare. For the intermediate range of tariff levels, I arises as the most preferred market structure. When trade policy is sufficiently restrictive, the duopoly with two international mergers II is the most preferred market structure for all substitutability levels. Note that even though consumers lose, due to concentration, and there is no tariff revenue, the tariff saving feature under international mergers dominates the other counter-acting effects.
Combining the above welfare analysis with proposition 3, we are able to shed light on the impact of trade policy commitment on the equilibrium market Next, we deviate from trade policy commitment and allow for trade policy in each country to respond to changes in market structure.
Equilibrium under Optimum Tariffs
Thus far, our analysis does not recognize the fact that trade policy in each country may respond to changes in market structures. To allow for this interaction, consider the following game. In the first stage, firm owners decide on merger formation to determine industry structure. Next, each country chooses a specific tariff on imports. Finally, firms compete in prices in the product market. Solving the game backwards, we have the same product market equilibrium as a function of tariffs and market structure as before. It is obvious in our model that there exist no tariffs under a duopoly with two international mergers II and under the remaining market structures, each country chooses its optimum tariff to maximize its welfare: 
The solution to the above problem yields the following optimum tariffs:
The tariff ranking shows that optimum tariffs rise as the market gets more concentrated nationally, while they decrease in the number of international mergers. This result argues that the interaction between the optimum tariffs and the industry concentration depends on the nature of the mergers (national or international). Unlike national mergers, foreign firms share the benefits from home protection in an international merger, and this reduces the incentives to impose tariffs. Two immediate questions arise: when countries can respond to mergers via optimal tariffs, what is the set of equilibrium market structures, and among these market structures, which are the ones that are preferred from a welfare point of view? In terms of equilibrium market structures, the optimal trade policy regime yields results similar to those obtained in our analysis of unilateral and bilateral trade liberalization. The first part of proposition 5 states that the protection gain dominates the tariff-jumping effect when products are close substitutes while the opposite obtains when products are sufficiently differentiated. Part (ii) of the above proposition argues that whether welfare superior market structure arises under endogenous tariffs depends on the degree of product differentiation. When products are close substitutes, optimal trade policy responses result in the least desired market structure ( NN ) as the equilibrium market structure. Finally, when the products are sufficiently differentiated, private and social incentives tend to move together.
Extension to Asymmetric Duopoly
So far we have restricted our analysis to mergers of two firms only in order to highlight the incentives to form national and international mergers of the same size. Next, we extend our analysis and include an asymmetric duopoly, denoted by I A where there is an international merger of three firms and a competing national firm. This analysis aims at shedding light on whether asymmetric duopoly is an equilibrium and how the tariff levels and the degree of product differentiation affect the size of an international merger. For simplicity, suppose that both home firms merge with a foreign firm and the other foreign firm stay as a competing unit:
While the profit maximization problem of non-merged foreign firm stays the same as under Φ , international merger solves the following problem in each market:
The simultaneous solution of first order conditions leads to the following equilibrium prices under I A :
Given that every merger is profitable and profitability rises with the size of the merger under price competition, it is immediate that I A always dominates Φ , N and I . We also find that the total industry profit under I A is always larger than the one under NN . Thus, the duopoly with two national mergers NN no longer arises in the equilibrium if an asymmetric duopoly is allowed to be formed. Intuitively, merging firms under I A enjoy from their deeper concentration without giving up the tariff protection in the home country's market. Then, in order to find the equilibrium market structure, it is enough to compare the industry profits under I A and II . We provide the equilibrium market structures in figure 7 and report the necessary calculations in the appendix. 
The following result directly follows figure 7: Proposition 6: Suppose that an asymmetric duopoly is allowed to be formed. Then, there exists a critical degree of product differentiation γ such that (i) when products are close substitutes (γ > γ), the asymmetric duopoly I A is the equilibrium market structure regardless of the tariff levels, and (ii) when products are sufficiently differentiated (γ < γ), the duopoly with two international mergers II is the equilibrium market structure only if t I A &II
The above proposition argues that when products are close substitutes, it is impossible for the outside foreign firm to convince either of the home firms under the asymmetric duopoly to form a merger, since the home firms under I A enjoy size advantage and tariff protection from their merger that are crucial when product competition is severe. In that sense, rather than the tariff levels, the degree of product differentiation plays a more decisive role when the comparison is between market structures that involve international mergers.
Conclusion
Using a model of endogenous merger formation, we examine the international linkages between the nature of mergers and tariff levels. By linking tariff levels and merger incentives, we aim at providing an explanation for the dominance of international mergers within the largest ever merger movement the world economy has experienced over the last three decades. Within the same framework, we focus on the merger policy implications of unilateral and bilateral trade liberalization as well.
In the merger formation process, we show that two effects play key roles: protection gain and tariff jumping. The former effect represents the anticompetitive impact of trade policy that arises when firms are national whereas the latter captures the incentives to avoid tariffs via an international merger. An analysis of these two effects shows that the tariff level and the degree of product differentiation together create a trade-off between the relative attractiveness of national and international mergers.
Focusing on unilateral trade liberalization, we first show that lowering home tariffs leads to international mergers irrespective of the substitutability levels when a foreign country practices free trade. By contrast, when foreign tariffs are sufficiently high and products are close substitutes, national mergers arise in the equilibrium. Therefore, the implications of unilateral trade liberalization on the equilibrium market structure depends on the trade regime in the foreign country especially when products are close substitutes.
Our main result in the paper predicts that when bilateral tariffs are sufficiently low and products are close substitutes, the equilibrium market structure involves international mergers only. Since these firms supply the export markets locally, this prediction stands in contrast to the tariff-jumping motive for FDI that predicts firms locate in an export market and serve it locally when tariffs are high. This result fits well with the fact that global trade liberalization has been accompanied by an increase in cross border merger activities. More complete analysis would also involve greenfield entry as a mode of entry. We leave this for future research.
Furthermore, from a welfare perspective, we show that international mergers are preferable to national mergers due to the fact that they help avoid deadweight loss of tariffs. Consequently, social and private incentives become aligned together as trade gets liberalized. This result provides support for the idea that there is scope for welfare-enhancing merger policies under a more liberal trade environment.
Following trade liberalization, other aspects of economic policy that are not harmonized have begun to receive more attention. The reduction in tariff rates has raised the issue of harmonization of competition policies. In policy making, national mergers are often viewed differently from cross-border mergers. Even though this study does not model harmonization explicitly, it can be captured simply through different fixed regulation fees imposed on national and international mergers. We intend to pursue this in future research.
Appendix
The following profit levels are used to prove the lemma and propositions. Note that profit levels under common tariff can be found easily by assuming t H = t F = t.
Under Φ : 
Proof of Lemma 1
Using the above profit levels, the proof of the lemma is immediate. Let Ω = 
where equality holds only when γ = 0. 
